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Abstract
In this contribution, we exploit machine learning techniques to predict the risk of failure of firms.
Then, we propose an empirical definition of zombies as firms that persist in a status of high
risk, beyond the highest decile, after which we observe that the chances to transit to lower risk
are minimal. We implement a Bayesian Additive Regression Tree with Missing Incorporated in
Attributes (BART-MIA), which is specifically useful in our setting as we provide evidence that
patterns of undisclosed accounts correlate with firms’ failures. After training our algorithm
on 304,906 firms active in Italy in the period 2008-2017, we show how it outperforms proxy
models like the Z-scores and the Distance-to-Default, traditional econometric methods, and
other widely used machine learning techniques. We document that zombies are on average
21% less productive, 76% smaller, and they increased in times of financial crisis. In general,
we argue that our application helps in the design of evidence-based policies in the presence of
market failures, for example optimal bankruptcy laws. We believe our framework can help to
inform the design of support programs for highly distressed firms after the recent pandemic
crisis.
Keywords: machine learning; Bayesian statistical learning; financial constraints; bankruptcy;
zombie firms
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1 Introduction
In this contribution, we propose machine learning techniques as suitable tools to provide
predictions of firms’ failures that can be used for credit scoring. Thus, we define zombies
as firms that persist in a high-risk status, i.e., they are located on the highest decile of
probability distributions of failures. In fact, we document that this is the segment of the
distribution after which the chances of transiting to a lower risk status are minimal.
The problem of spotting non-viable firms is relevant for both academics and practition-
ers, whether the reason is to assess the credit risk of a single firm or to detect the portion
of an entire economy that is in trouble. Traditionally, the problem is studied through the
lens of a financial company that needs assessing the healthiness of a firm from albeit limited
information retrieved from financial accounts1. Hence, scholars and practitioners have been
struggling for decades to spot a firm’s viability after benchmark exercises on firm-level in-
dicators of financial constraints, e.g., when estimating the Z-scores (Altman, 1968; Altman
et al., 2000), the Distance-to-Default of a firm (Merton, 1974), or the investment-to-cash-
flow sensitivity (Fazzari et al., 1988). Eventually, if a financial company keeps credit flowing
to otherwise insolvent firms, it may be stuck in a zombie-lending relationship (Peek and
Rosengren, 2005; Caballero et al., 2008). In this case, a financial company may not find it
convenient to pull the plug off credit and let the firm go bankrupt because it prefers avoid-
ing disclosure of a too high share of non-performing loans. Thus, a so-called zombie firm
outlives the market only because it has access to external financial resources. Recent OECD
studies (Andrews et al., 2017; McGowan et al., 2018; Banerjee and Hofmann, 2018; Andrews
and Petroulakis, 2019) extend the notion of zombie firms to include all low-productivity
firms that would typically exit in a competitive market. Crucially, they show that zombies
1The seminal reference is to a departure from the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, according to
which capital structures should not be relevant to a firm’s value in the absence of market frictions, among
others including bankruptcy costs. Hence, its ability to find external financial resources should entirely
rely on the viability of its investment projects. However, since frictions cannot be expunged from financial
markets, a company’s capital structure is actually informative on the viability of a firm and its investment
projects. See also the discussion by Rajan and Zingales (1995) for an international perspective.
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represent a non-negligible share of modern economies, up to 10% of incumbent firms, while
absorbing up to 15%, 19% and 28% of the capital stock in countries like Spain, Italy, and
Greece, respectively. In fact, in some economic environments more than others, market selec-
tion processes may not work properly for a variety of reasons, and spotting non-viable firms
can be especially useful for avoiding a misallocation of productive and financial resources.
Against this background, we argue that the empirical problem of assessing whether a firm
is a zombie is strictly related to the more general problem of determining its credit risk and,
in turn, a measure of credit risk can be usefully framed in terms of survival to bankruptcy.
In the end, a zombie is a non-viable firm that can escape failure despite its extreme financial
distress, i.e., despite having the highest credit risk. Taken from another perspective, the
healthier firms are, the farther both from bankruptcy and zombie status.
For our purpose, we implement a Bayesian Additive Regression Tree with Missing In-
corporated in Attributes (BART-MIA) (Kapelner and Bleich, 2015), which is robust to
non-random patterns of missing financial accounts. The ability of BART-MIA to learn from
missing values is especially useful when distressed firms have the possibility to conceal infor-
mation, as we find that there is a positive correlation between a firm’s failure and patterns of
missing financial accounts in our data. Indeed, we provide evidence that most missing vari-
ables are often the ones that have been used as proxies for zombies or financial constraints.
To shed light on our hypotheses, we start by training the BART-MIA on a sample of
304,906 Italian firms in the period 2008-2017. From our point of view, Italy is a compelling
case of a country that hosts a relevant share of inefficient firms that hamper the potential of
the economy (Calligaris et al., 2018). In addition, Italy is one of the countries most severely
hit by the recent pandemic crisis, after firms had to lock down and financial distress increased.
In similar cases, the call between viable firms and zombies is tougher for a policymaker that
wants to support the economy while avoiding waste of financial resources.
The underlying intuition is simple. Based on the experience of firms that already failed
in previous periods, we derive predictions on the risk of failure of firms that operate in the
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following periods. Every time we compare observed outcomes against predicted outcomes,
the algorithm updates and reduces the prediction errors in the next periods after processing
new in-sample information on financial accounts. We end up with a probabilistic measure
of firms’ likelihoods to fail that one can use to assess credit risk: the higher the value of
the probabilistic measure, the less viable the firm is on the market. Our machine learning
framework improves upon existing models of credit rating by exploiting an extensive battery
of firm-level economic and financial indicators that potentially incorporate different pieces
of information regarding both the core economic activity of the firm and its ability to meet
financial obligations. Indeed, our baseline predictions explain up to 0.97 of Area-Under-the-
Curve (AUC), and the Precision-Recall (PR) performance reaches 0.75.
Further, we show how BART-MIA outperforms previous credit scoring models (i.e., Z-
score and Distance-to-Default models), standard econometric methods (i.e., a simple logistic
regression), and also other machine learning techniques (i.e., Classification and Regression
Tree, Random Forest, Super Learner). Crucially, we find that emerging patterns of missing
financial accounts correlate with a firm’s failure, possibly because managers more likely
conceal accounts when under financial distress. The latter correlation is the main reason why
BART-MIA is the best predictive algorithm in our setting since it exploits the information
on missing values as yet another predictor of the outcome.
Interestingly, when we implement a rigorous LOGIT-LASSO (Ahrens et al., 2020; Belloni
et al., 2016a) to check which indicators better contribute to predicting firms’ failures on our
training sample, we find that:
(i) no single indicator predicts better than the ensemble a firms’ failure, because each taken
alone ends up with a higher rate of false positives when the test wrongly indicates that
a firm is at a high risk of failure, or a higher rate of false negatives when the test
wrongly indicates that a firm is viable;
(ii) the ranking of indicators is different from one year to the other, as the algorithm
usefully responds to updates after new out-of-sample information becomes available,
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while catching unobserved peculiarities of the economic environment.
In fact, by construction, machine learning techniques work better than single binary indica-
tors if one includes as much valuable in-sample information as possible, while updating every
time there is new out-of-sample information, because prediction errors dynamically reduce
after independent tests that minimize deviations between realized and predicted outcomes
(Athey, 2018).
Finally, we define a zombie firm as a firm that persists in a status of high risk, which we
conventionally set above the 9th decile of our predictions of failure for at least three years.
The latter threshold is particularly meaningful, since we find that the chances to transit to a
lower risk are minimal, whereas up to 64% firms get stuck in following periods. A probation
period of three years allow discounting some short-term break-even strategies, for example
by start-ups. Following our definitions, we find that in Italy the share of zombies falls in a
range between 2.5% and 4.5% along the period of analysis. Interestingly, we document that
zombies :
(i) are counter-cyclical, as their share increases in times of crisis and decreases in times of
economic recovery;
(ii) are on average 21% less productive and 75% smaller if size is measured in terms of
employment.
In conclusion, we argue that our framework should be of general interest to the poli-
cymaker, for example, when she has to design optimal bankruptcy laws2. Indeed, tracking
a firm’s risk of failure allows all stakeholders, not only creditors, to understand whether
there is a chance for restructuring and, if not, to prevent incumbent albeit non-viable firms
from wasting additional economic resources. Evidence-based methods are even more impor-
tant after the recent pandemic crisis since we expect that financial support needs targeting
2See also the suggestions by the European Directive 2012/30/EU, and the recent Italian Law on business
failures on October 19th, 2017, n. 155 that lays the legal foundations for early signaling of firm’s crises to
enhance targeted interventions.
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firms that have a real chance to recover and stay on their feet in regular times, avoiding a
misallocation of resources.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our data,
and we provide some preliminary evidence. In Section 3 we illustrate our empirical strategy
and show baseline results. Section 4 shows how zombie firms are. Section 5 concludes with
a discussion of potential applications and future work.
2 Data and preliminary evidence
We source financial accounts from the ORBIS database3, compiled by the Bureau Van Dijk,
for manufacturing firms active in Italy at least one year in the period 2008-2017. Notably,
Italy is a compelling case to study firms’ failures and zombie firms. It is a country where
relatively inefficient firms hamper the economy’s growth potential (Calligaris et al., 2016;
Bugamelli et al., 2018), perpetuating geographic divergence (Rungi and Biancalani, 2019),
and extensively studied by international organizations (McGowan et al., 2018; Andrews and
Petroulakis, 2019).
For our purpose, we use two main variables that help to identify firms’ failures: the status
of a firm and the date in which it becomes inactive. Table 1 depicts our sample coverage by
firm status in the period of analysis. We assume that a company failed in the first year when
it is reported as being “Bankrupted”, “Dissolved,” or “In Liquidation” as from original data.
Altogether, the share of exiting firms constitutes about 5.7% of the entire sample, which is a
figure not too far from the average official 6.3% indicated by ISTAT, the national statistics
3ORBIS firm-level data (Orbis, 2020) have become a common source for global financial accounts. For
a previous usage of this database, among others, see Gopinath et al. (2017) and Cravino and Levchenko
(2016). Coverage of smaller firms and some financial accounts can change from country to country, following
filing requirements by national business registries, as observed in validation exercises by Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. (2015) and Gal (2013). In the case of Italy, the original information provider for Italian financial
accounts is CERVED, a credit rating agency. The Bureau Van Dijk standardizes and translates original
financial accounts to make them comparable across countries. Please note that ORBIS, differently from
other platforms from the same Bureau Van Dijk (e.g., AIDA or AMADEUS), does not drop exiting firms in
our period of analysis. It complements financial accounts with other information from different sources on
ownership, management, and intellectual property rights, which we also use for predictions.
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office, for the same period. Figure 1 maps the firms’ failures by NUTS 3-digit regions in
logarithmic scale. As expected, we find a concentration of failures in metropolitan regions
but full representativeness of the entire Italian territory, as we detect failures in any region
in our period of analysis.
Table 1: Firms by status
Status Active Bankrupted Dissolved In Liquidation Total
Sample 287,586 1,533 8,540 7,221 304,906
Percentage 94.33% 0.50% 2.80% 2.37% 100%
Figure 1: Geographic Coverage
Note: Number of firms’ failures reported in log scale for NUTS 3 regions. We assume a firm fails when
it is reported as “Bankrupted”, “Dissolved or “In liquidation”. A greater number of failures is reported
in metropolitan areas (Milan, 1,016; Rome, 1007; Naples, 840; Turin, 616). All regions are covered in
our sample.
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Additionally, we use a wide battery of economic and financial indicators to train our pre-
dictive models. The battery includes: i) original firm-level financial accounts; ii) indicators
that have been adopted in previous literature to proxy firm-level financial constraints; iii)
indicators that have been used so far to spot zombie firms ; iv) indicators that are adopted
as an alert on firms’ crises in the most recent Italian bankruptcy law4. Any predictor we
consider is described in detail in an Appendix Table A1.
Please note that many of the indicators that we pick as predictors have been used in very
different frameworks to assess how much a firm is in trouble. From our machine learning per-
spective, they cannot be interpreted as drivers of failure. It is sufficient that they contribute
with an albeit small piece of information on the healthiness of a firm. In our prediction
framework, they can even border on multicollinearity, as for example in the case of different
measures of efficiency, liquidity, and solvency ratios. As far as we are not interested in the
identification of a causal contribution to a firm’s failure, multicollinearity is not a problem
for our predictions (Makridakis et al., 2008; Shmueli et al., 2010). On the contrary, we will
discuss in Section 3.4 how, by construction, one cannot seal off the empirical contribution
of one indicator from the entire set in a context of a pure prediction problem. For this
reason, the set of predictors we use should be considered as a non-separable ensemble, and
a discussion on the statistical significance of each predictor is not relevant for our scope.
In Appendix Figure A1, we visualize a map of missing values in our sample. Besides
mandatory and basic information (volume of activity, profits, location, industry affiliation,
ownership, and intellectual property rights), many other financial accounts show different
patterns of missing values across firms. After we run a series of chi-squared tests in Appendix
Table A2, we do find that there is a positive statistical association between the patterns we
observe from the sample and the event of a firm’s failure. In a nutshell, it is more likely
4A recent reform of the bankruptcy law (L. 155/2017 and DL. 14/2019) proposes an early warning system
based on indicators identified by practitioners. The purpose is to spot firms that are in trouble before it is
too late, preserving entrepreneurial abilities and finding a way out of the crisis. It delegated practitioners
(specifically the national accountants’ association: “Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli
Esperti Contabili”) to provide a list of indicators that could help assess the status of a firm’s crisis.
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that a firm will fail when a pattern of missing financial accounts is observed. The exercise
performed in Table 2 clearly shows such correlations. We run a simple logistic regression
taking as a dependent variable the observed failure of a firm. Then, we include a binary
regressor equal to one if the predictor is missing at least once in the three years before
the failure occurs. Fixed effects by NUTS 3-digit region and NACE 2-digit industries are
included. We report results by each predictor by row in Table 2.
Table 2: Missing predictors and firms’ failures
Missing predictor Odds ratio Std. Error N. obs. Pseudo R2
Interest Coverage Ratio 1.91*** (0.30) 304,906 0.026
Interest Benchmarking 1.29*** (0.20) 304,906 0.019
Value Added 2.37*** (0.37) 304,906 0.033
Z-score 2.55*** (0.38) 304,906 0.037
Total Factor Productivity 2.37*** (0.39) 304,906 0.034
Profitability 1.91*** (0.30) 304,906 0.027
Note: We report odds ratios after a logit specification where the dependent variable is a firm’s failure
and the binary regressor is equal to one when at least one missing value is detected in the latest three
years. Fixed effects at the region and industry level. Errors are clustered by industry.
The correlations reported above are particularly relevant for the scope of our analyses.
The main issue is sample selection when observations are selectively missing for some cate-
gories of firms. In this case, we have two potential sources of sample selection bias: i) firms
in distress vis a` vis firms not in distress, because the first can have an incentive to disclose
less information than the latter; ii) smaller firms vis a` vis bigger firms because the first are
often exempted from a full financial report, according to Italian regulation 5. In fact, the
two sources can overlap, since smaller firms may also be the ones that suffer relatively more
from financial distress. The application of a BART-MIA procedure, as described in Section
5Following Italian civil law, companies that do not quote financial activities on the stock exchange have
the possibility to present more aggregate financial accounts when their size does not exceed simultaneously
two of the following thresholds, for one or two consecutive periods: i) 4,400,000 euro of total assets; ii)
8,800,000 euro of operating revenues; iii) 50 employees. A limited financial statement always includes main
items at the first or second digit of aggregation.
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3, allows us considering both sources of sample selection when patterns of missing financial
accounts emerge because the algorithm includes such patterns as a further predictor of firms’
failures.
Interestingly, we find that most missing variables are also the ones that have been used
in previous works as proxies for zombies or financial constraints. Take, for example, the case
of the Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR), derived as a ratio between the earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT) and the interest expenses of a firm. When ICR is lower than one, Bank of
England (2013) assumes that a firm is a zombie since it has problems in meeting financial
obligations. In our sample, we find that about 19% of firms have an ICR smaller than one
but, at the same time, there are 62.50% firms whose information on ICR is not present at all.
Further, according to Bank of Korea (2013), a negative value-added is the most appropriate
proxy for assessing a zombie status because it indicates that intermediate inputs have a higher
market value than the firm’s output. In the case of Italy, about 64.27% of companies do not
report information on value-added in at least one period, while about 3% of them report a
negative figure. Clearly, negative value added is a stricter condition than negative profits,
as a firm can have no profits without destroying economic value. Indeed, firms’ profitability
is at the core of two very similar proxies of zombies adopted by Schivardi et al. (2017),
when they compare firm-level profits with an external benchmark. Reproducing the same
exercises, we find that about 3% of Italian firms are in trouble, while a large amount of the
sample (62.50%) does not report any information on the predictor. Finally, both Caballero
et al. (2008) and McGowan et al. (2018) run another benchmarking exercise comparing the
interest paid by a firm to obtain external financial resources against the cost opportunity to
invest in alternative safer assets. In our case, when we try to reproduce the same exercise
with the yields on Italian state-issued bonds with a maturity of ten years, we find there is a
high share (60.29%) of firms for which we do not have any information in at least one period
when it was active.
Finally, we include as a predictor an estimate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) follow-
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ing the methodology proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2015), to take into account the simul-
taneity bias deriving from ex-post adjustments in the combination of factors of production.
In this regard, firm-level TFPs allow us predictions based on the ability to transform inputs
and sell the output on the market. In fact, the relationship between financial constraints and
productivity is one of the most debated (see among others: Aghion et al. (2019); Ferrando
and Ruggieri (2018)). The simple guess for our predictive models is that less productive firms
are the ones that may encounter more difficulties in surviving to the market. At the same
time, zombie firms have been often defined also in terms of (lack of) productivity (McGowan
et al., 2018; Andrews et al., 2017; Andrews and Petroulakis, 2019).
3 Empirical strategy
Spotting a non-viable firm is difficult for obvious reasons. If financial accounts are bad, one
could argue that it is just a matter of time before the becomes more competitive, given
the right conditions. If financial accounts are good, one could argue that the worst has yet
to come, because bad management choices will show up later. Trivially, only firms that
are already bankrupt were certainly non-viable at some point. Still, an external observer
will never know when it exactly happened because the manager of a firm in trouble has an
incentive not to share private information.
In principle, an analyst would like to observe the entire horizon of the events to discount
all possible scenarios and understand the value of a firm and its investment projects. But
it is not possible, as this is the typical twin problem of a financial institution that faces
uncertainty in the presence of informational asymmetries. On the one hand, the company
has a distinct information advantage in its investment plans. On the other hand, both
the financial institution and the company have limited power in predicting future economic
shocks that may have either a positive or a negative impact.
In this context, we propose a machine learning framework that uses past information
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about already failed firms to assess what the probability is that another firm in a similar
shape will go bankrupt6. The wider the variety of past experiences we can rely on, the more
precise the prediction on the healthiness, or lack thereof, of a firm (Kleinberg et al., 2015).
Ultimately, ours is a perspective on the (lack of) resilience of a firm potentially using all
the observables that could possibly hold a piece of information on its viability. We end up
with a firm-level probabilistic measure bounded between 0 and 1 that tells us what is the
chance that a firm exits from the market in the next period since other firms in a similar
condition did. As we plot in Figure 2, the idea is that we can assess the distance of each
firm from the highest financial distress, which we conventionally may assume in red above
the 9th decile. In fact, following analyses will show that the highest decile is the segment of
the risk distribution after which it is very difficult to transit back to lower distress.
Figure 2: Fictional distribution of failure’s probability
Importantly, we want to underline that it is not of our concern the identification of the
drivers of firms’ failures since ours is a straightforward prediction framework. Nonetheless,
we do show later in the analysis how a list of best predictors of bankruptcy can change over
6Previous exercises to predict firms’ failures from financial accounts have been tried in data science
literature, although in the absence of a clear economic and financial framework. In this regard, Bargagli-
Stoffi et al. (2020b) provide an extensive overview of the most recent data science literature related to the
usage of machine learning for firm dynamics. Previous exercises using data similar to ours include Moscatelli
et al. (2019) for Italy, and Weinblat (2018).
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time, given the circumstances in which we run predictions, every time one updates with new
out-of-sample information.
3.1 Predictions of failures
Let us consider a generic predictive model in the form:
f(Xi) = Pr(Yi = 1 |Xi = x) (1)
where Yi is the binary realization of the outcome assuming value 1 if the ith firm exits from
the market and zero otherwise, while Xi is the P -dimensional vector of firm-level predictors,
where P is the number of predictors included in the model. The functional form that links
predictors to outcomes is determined by the generic supervised machine learning technique
used to predict out-of-sample information. Briefly, the generic algorithm will pick the best
in-sample loss-minimizing function in the form:
arg min
N∑
i=1
L(f(xi), yi) over f(·) ∈ F s. t. R
(
f(·)) ≤ c (2)
where F is a function class from where to pick f(·), and R(f(·)) is the generic regularizer
that summarizes the complexity of f(·). See also Mullainathan and Spiess (2017). In our
case, the function f(·) is an element from the family of classification trees, or a combination
thereof. The set of regularizers, R’s, will change following the standards adopted by each
method. Eventually, any algorithm shall take a loss function L(f(xi), yi) as an input and
look for the function that minimizes prediction losses7. Eventually, given new out-of-sample
information, we derive a prediction for the failure of any firm based on the set of its up-to-
7For a general reference, see Breiman et al. (1984). Any tree T is built on if-then statements that split
the dataset according to the observed values of predictors, allowing for non-linear relationships between the
predictors and the outcomes. Hence, the generic algorithm for the construction of a tree, T , is based on a
top-down approach that recursively splits the main sample into non-overlapping sub-samples (i.e. the nodes
and the leaves). Then, the tree is pruned iteratively with the regularizer R to improve its predictive ability
and avoid data overfitting, when trees become too deep along many layers.
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date financial accounts, both in the case of incumbent firms that already operated in previous
periods and in the case of firms entering into the market for the first time. From another
perspective, we interpret this probability range as a degree of risk by an investor that does
not have any other information than what is included in the actual financial accounts.
In the following analyses, we consider as a baseline the BART - Bayesian Additive Re-
gression Tree (Chipman et al., 2010). More specifically, we adopt a variant (BART-MIA)
that is robust to non-random patterns of missing values in financial accounts to predict firms’
failures (Kapelner and Bleich, 2015). To assess the performance of the model, we implement
a standard two-fold cross-validation procedure that assigns 90% of the observations to the
training sample and 10% to the test sample (Devijver and Kittler, 1982).
In general, the BART is an ensemble method based on the aggregation of different inde-
pendent trees and three regularizing priors designed to prevent overfitting. The BART-MIA
variant we adopt can be expressed as:
Yi = f(Xi) + i ≈ T1(Xi) + ...+ Tq(Xi) + i, i ∼ N (0, σ2), (3)
where the q distinct binary trees are denoted by T , and each single tree comes with an
entire structure made of nodes and leaves. The Bayesian component of the BART includes
three priors: (i) the prior on the probability that a node will split at depth k is β(1 + k)−η,
where β ∈ (0, 1), η ∈ [0,∞), and the hyper-parameters are chosen to be η = 2 and β = 0.95;
(ii) the prior on the probability distribution in the leaves is a normal distribution with zero
mean: N (0, σ2q ), where σq = σ0/
√
q and σ0 can be used to calibrate the plausible range of
the regression function; (iii) the prior on the error variance is σ2 ∼ Inv−Gamma(v/2, vλ/2)
where λ is determined from the data in a way that the BART will improve 90% of the times
the root mean squared error (RMSE) of an OLS model.
BART-MIA extends the original BART algorithm by incorporating additional informa-
tion coming from patterns of missing values (Kapelner and Bleich, 2015). This is done by
13
introducing, in each binary-tree component of the BART algorithm, the possibility to split
on a missingness feature. As shown by Twala et al. (2008), this splitting-rule allows trees to
better capture the direct influence of missing values as a further predictor of the response
variable. Indeed, we observed in Section 2 how patterns of missing financial information are
not random, or at least not completely random, with respect to firms’ failures. If firms are
financially distressed and/or if firms are smaller, it is more likely that they will be missing
in any firm-level dataset. In this case, na¨ıvely trimming the missing observations would
introduce a sample selection bias, i.e., it would more likely exclude some categories of firms
whose probability to fail is higher. Standard imputation techniques (e.g., conditional median
imputation, Bayesian imputation) cannot solve the sample selection problem, as far as they
are based on the use of in-sample information. Usefully, BART-MIA creates a new label
when the values of a specific firm-level financial account are missing, and it tests the new
label as an additional predictor for a firm’s failure.
3.2 Validation against other machine learning techniques
We compare the quality of the prediction of BART-MIA with the Conditional Inference Tree
(Hothorn et al., 2006), the Random Forest (Breiman, 2001), and the Super Learner (Van der
Laan et al., 2007). The Conditional Inference Tree (Hothorn et al., 2006) that we apply is a
simple variant of the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) algorithm (Breiman et al.,
1984) based on a significance test procedure that avoids a bias towards variables with many
possible splits (see Ode´n et al. (1975); Loh (2002); Hothorn et al. (2006)). The Random
Forest is an ensemble method that aggregates different trees to get a stronger predictive
power, and each tree is constructed by randomly picking different variables among all the
possible predictors and randomly selecting a subset of the total number of observations (see
also Breiman (2001)). The Super Learner (Van der Laan et al., 2007) is based on a weighted
combination of other algorithms Van der Laan et al. (2007). For our purposes, we build
the Super Learner as a convex combination of a logistic regression model, a Conditional
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Interference Tree and a Random Forest.
Table 3: Models’ horse race: out-of-sample prediction accuracy
Model PR AUC F1-score BACC R2 Train Obs Test Obs
Logit 0.3576 0.8896 0.2098 0.8433 0.0829 83,537 9,282
Ctree 0.3568 0.8889 0.2000 0.7804 0.0654 83,537 9,282
Random Forest 0.4262 0.9050 0.2257 0.8515 0.0922 83,537 9,282
Super Learner 0.4311 0.9073 0.2232 0.8666 0.0945 83,537 9,282
BART-MIA 0.7484 0.9667 0.6328 0.8993 0.4038 83,537 9,282
In Table 3 and Figure 3, we show how BART-MIA always outperforms other state-of-the-
art methods from the literature. It also has a higher predictive power than a classical logistic
regression8. To compare the power of predictions across methods, in Table 3, we show five
different performance measures commonly used for classification problems: Precision-Recall
(PR); Area Under the receiver operating characteristic Curve (AUC); F1-Score; Balanced
ACCuracy (BACC); adjusted R2. Both AUC and PR vary between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates
complete misclassification and 1 indicates perfect prediction. The AUC (Hanley and McNeil,
1982) is a general measure of predictive power that tells us how much we are able to classify
failures vis a` vis non-failures, hence with an accent on the false discovery rate (FDR). PR is
particularly useful for our scope, because it accounts for both the overall share of true failures
that we are able to predict in the data (i.e., the sensitivity/recall of predictions), as well as
for the proportion of predicted failures that reveal to be true failures (i.e.,the precision of
predictions). In fact, an evaluation of the sensitivity/recall alone could be misleading in a
zero-inflated setting like ours, where the number of non-failures systematically exceeds the
number of failures (for more details, see Saito and Rehmsmeier (2015); Fawcett (2006)). The
F1-score (Van Rijsbergen, 1979) and the BACC (Brodersen et al., 2010) are used for cases of
8Please note how BART-MIA could always use a larger training sample, including firms that report
missing values on predictors. This is an additional advantage of our baseline methodology. However, for
sake of comparison, all methodologies in Table 3 have been trained on the same subset of roughly 84,000
observations for the training and 9,000 for the testing, without considering missing values.
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unbalanced data. The first is based on a harmonic mean of precision and recall, whereas the
second is a simple average between the rate of true positives and the rate of true negatives
from our predictions.
Figure 3: Out-of-sample Goodness-of-Fit
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Predictions from BART-MIA show a PR equal to 0.75 and an AUC equal to 0.97. In this
context, the second best predictor is the Super Learner, which however stops at 0.43 and
0.91 in terms of PR and AUC, respectively.9. Interestingly, the greater improvement comes
from a higher precision. This is shown by the larger gaps of the BART-MIA with respect
to the performance measures that leverage on precision (namely, PR and F1-score). The
latter is central to our purpose, as it means that BART-MIA has a higher predictive power
in assessing which firms will fail one year from predictions.
3.3 Validation against proxy models of credit scoring
So far, we compared predictions of failures from different econometric and machine learning
techniques, and we showed how BART-MIA displayed a higher predictive ability. Here, we
compare our baseline predictions with widely known proxies for firm-level credit scores: the
Z-scores (Altman, 1968) and the Distance-to-Default (Merton, 1974).
In the case of Z-scores, a selection of financial ratios (profitability, leverage, liquidity,
solvency, and volumes of activity) is plugged in an equation with some weights to proxy
their relative importance. The weights are taken from literature and obtained from previous
scholarly estimates on the relative importance of these indicators in assessing a firm’s dis-
tress. Hence, one gets a threshold that, if crossed, indicates that there is a high probability
of bankruptcy in the next future. Different from the Z-scores, the Distance-to-Default by
Merton (1974) focuses specifically on the ability of a company to meet its financial obliga-
tions. The original intuition is that a company’s equity can be modeled as a call option on
its assets. Hence, to build it, one needs combining firm-level accounts (company’s assets,
debts, market value) and information retrieved on financial markets (risk-free interest rate,
a standard deviation of stock returns). Eventually, one plugs the variables in an equation
9It is worth noticing that the Super Learner is performing better than the Random Forest with respect to
the accuracy, but not with respect to the F1-score. This is due to the fact that the Super Learner algorithm
(Van der Laan et al., 2007) is optimized in a way to find a convex combination of algorithms that minimizes
the accuracy of the ensemble method. In this particular case, this strategy is not optimal as the output data
are unbalanced.
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that returns the value of a theoretically fair call option10.
We estimate both the Z-scores and the Distance-to-Default, and we report their predictive
power in Table 4. In line with the interpretation of Z-scores, we decided to publish a full range
of thresholds across the deciles by increasing levels of firms’ distress. Distance-to-Default
predictions show both higher precision (0.2680 vs. 0.1613) and a lower false discovery rate
(0.7320 vs. 0.8387) than the ones obtained by Z-scores. However, BART-MIA outperforms
both models, since its precision and false discovery rates are 0.8278 and 0.1722, respectively,
when we fix the sample on the same number of observations for which data are available to
calculate proxy models.
Table 4: Goodness-of-fit of Distance-to-Default (DtD) and Z-scores
Decile Precision DtD FDR DtD Precision Z-score FDR Z-score
1st 0.2680 0.7320 0.1613 0.8387
2nd 0.2680 0.7320 0.1505 0.8495
3rd 0.2680 0.7320 0.1505 0.8495
4th 0.2258 0.7742 0.1371 0.8629
5th 0.2022 0.7978 0.1269 0.8731
6th 0.1759 0.8241 0.1185 0.8815
7th 0.1569 0.8431 0.1108 0.8892
8th 0.1467 0.8533 0.1036 0.8964
9th 0.1411 0.8589 0.0981 0.9019
10th 0.1313 0.8687 0.0969 0.9031
Note: Performance of predictions to compare with BART-MIA. On the same test set for which we
have no missing values in Distance-to-Default and Z-scores, BART-MIA’s precision is 0.8278 and false
discovery rate (FDR) is 0.1722.
3.4 High dimension is not ‘a curse’ for failures
In previous analyses, we explicitly claimed that we needed as much in-sample information
as possible to reduce out-of-sample errors in predictions. On the other hand, there could
10After the insights of the distance-to-default model, Black and Scholes (1973) developed their widely
known model based on the observation that hedging an option one could remove a systemic risk component.
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be problems of overfitting when data dimensionality increases11. In this Section, we show
what happens when we sift through firm-level data and try to extract a set of predictors
with the highest ability to spot financial distress. The natural candidate tool to shrink the
dimensionality of a matrix of predictors is the LOGIT-LASSO (Ahrens et al., 2019), whose
functional form in a panel setting is the following:
arg min
β∈Rp
1
2N
N∑
i=1
(
yi,t(x
T
i,t−1β)− log(1 + e(x
T
i,t−1β))
)2
subject to ‖β‖1 ≤ k. (4)
where yi,t is a binary variable equal to one if a firm i failed at time t and zero otherwise.
Any xi,t−1 is a lagged predictor chosen in Rp at time t − 1, whereas ‖β‖1 =
∑p
j=1 |βj| and
k > 0. The constraint ‖β‖1 ≤ k limits the complexity of the model to avoid overfitting,
and k is chosen, following Ahrens et al. (2019), as the value that maximises the Extended
Bayesian Information Criteria (Chen and Chen, 2008). To account for the potential presence
of heteroskedastic, non-Gaussian and cluster-dependent errors, we adopt the rigorous penal-
ization introduced by Belloni et al. (2016a). Top ten highest-ranked predictors are presented
in Table 5.
Even though number of predictors varies in time, up to a maximum of twenty-one fea-
tures in 2015, we find a core set of predictors that are frequently selected. The stable set
includes indicators of financial distress (Liquidity Returns, Interest Coverage Ratio, Interest
Benchmark, Financial Constraint), as well as indicators related to the core economic activ-
ities of the firms (Negative Value Added, Total Factor Productivity, Size-Age). Apparently,
firms that are controlled by parent companies (Corporate Control) are less likely to fail in
every period, i.e., the predictor enters in the algorithm with a negative coefficient. The
same happens for the Dummy Trademarks and the Dummy Patents, as it makes sense that
intangible assets reduces the probability to exit from the market12.
11The so-called curse of dimensionality is an obstacle in many cases, when one works with finite data
samples and many variables. The seminal reference is to the work by Bellman (1961), who introduced the
notion of dimensionality reduction.
12See Table A1 for a full description of predictors and their construction.
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Table 5: Top 10 predictors for firms’ failures - Results from a rigorous LOGIT-LASSO
Rank 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
1 Liquidity Returns Negative Value Added Negative Value Added Negative Value Added Liquidity Returns Negative Value Added Negative Value Added Negative Value Added Negative Value Added
2 Negative Value Added Liquidity Returns Corporate Control Liquidity Returns Negative Value Added Profitability Liquidity Returns Liquidity Returns Liquidity Returns
3 Corporate Control Corporate Control Financial Constraint Solvency Ratio Solvency Ratio Financial Constraint Financial Constraint Profitability Financial Constraint
4 Interest Coverage Ratio Financial Constraint Interest Coverage Ratio Profitability Profitability Corporate Control Corporate Control Financial Constraint Profitability
5 Financial Constraint Interest Coverage Ratio Profitability Financial Constraint Corporate Control Solvency Ratio Solvency Ratio Corporate Control Corporate Control
6 Solvency Ratio Size-Age Solvency Ratio Corporate Control Financial Constraint Interest Coverage Ratio Size-age Solvency Ratio Solvency Ratio
7 Size-age Solvency Ratio Size-age Size-age Size-Age Liquidity Returns Interest Coverage Ratio Region (NUTS 2) Interest Coverage Ratio
8 Profitability Profitability Interest Benchmark Interest Coverage Ratio Interest Coverage Ratio Size-age Financial Misallocation Dummy Trademarks Dummy Trademarks
9 Interest Benchmark Interest Benchmark Liquidity Ratio TFP TFP Dummy Patents Dummy Trademarks Interest Coverage Ratio Size-age
10 Liquidity Ratio Liquidity Ratio Capital Intensity Liquidity Ratio Dummy Patents Dummy Trademarks Dummy Patents Dummy Patents Capital Intensity
Note: The rankings are obtained after the implementation of a rigorous LOGIT-LASSO (Ahrens et al., 2020; Belloni et al., 2016b) every year on
the entire battery of predictors described in Figure A1. Only the first ten selections are reported. The procedure selects a different number of
predictors every year, up to a maximum of 21.
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Some of the top predictors we show have been used to measure either financial distress
or zombie lending. However, the ranking changes over time, and we do not detect any
meaningful pattern in these changes. In this context, we cannot rely on a single indicator
(or a set thereof) to derive predictions of failures. If we did, we would have a higher rate of
false positives (when our forecasts indicate that a firm is at risk of failure, but it is not) and
a higher rate of false negatives (when the predictions wrongly suggest that a firm in trouble
deserves credit).
In fact, at this stage, we cannot exclude that a different ranking over time is due to better
use of the newly acquired in-sample information after new failures have been observed. Also,
it might be the case that a change in rankings reflects some shift in the business environment
in which companies operate. We presume that applications to different aggregates (countries,
regions, industries) may return different rankings. In the spirit of a pure prediction problem,
we conclude that it is better to keep the entire battery of predictors, as far as a dimensionality
problem on the predictors does not arise, when we can train predictions on a large enough
number of firm-level observed outcomes.
3.5 Robustness and sensitivity checks
The first robustness we implement is to check whether any imputation of missing values al-
lows us to obtain better predictions after reverting to other techniques different from BART-
MIA. We adopt a CART-based methodology (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2010), in
the fashion of White et al. (2018), to fill in the missing financial accounts. We do not find
any sensitive change in the ranking observed in Table 3. More in general, any finer tuning
on the hyper-parameters does not seem to overturn the gap in performance between the
BART-MIA and the other techniques.
A second check is done with respect to our choice of predictors. We want to be sure
that nothing relevant is missing from our battery of predictors described in Table A1. Our
sensitivity check is done in two steps by simulating synthetic predictors. In a first step,
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we generate a predictor whose correlation with the outcome of failure is as high as one
of the best-observed predictors (0.5), but it is not significantly correlated with any of the
other predictors (for more details on this methodology, see Bargagli-Stoffi et al. (2020a)).
Hence, we check that its inclusion in a new augmented model affects unit-level predictions
only in 0.88% of cases (namely, just 0.88% of the predictions of the augmented model are
significantly different from the predictions of the original in (3)). Then, we repeat the exercise
by simulating a second synthetic predictor that is assumed correlated with both the outcome
(0.5) and a predictor (0.3). In this case, unit-level predictions change only in 0.90% of cases.
We conclude that the original choice of predictors already captures the bulk of the signal in
the data13.
A third issue we want to address is the zero-inflated nature of our outcome variable. Any
data set will structurally include a greater majority of incumbent firms that rarely exit from
the market, i.e., the zeros. In contrast, the share of firms’ failures is usually of a one-digit
magnitude. For example, in the case of Italy, as from Table 1, only 5.7% of firms failed in our
period of analysis, in line with official figures from the Italian national statistics bureau. To
clarify the nature of the problem, if we applied a methodology that predicted all the firms to
fail in our data, we would still get an accuracy measure for correctly classified observations
over total observations of 94.3%. To deal with similar unbalanced outcomes, one could
either under-sample the label that accounts for the largest majority of observations, or over-
sample observations for the other label, as suggested in other applications (Gruszczyn´ski,
2019; Zhou, 2013). In our case, we argue that any re-sampling method is sub-optimal
because we know from Section 2, Table 2, and Appendix Table A2 that patterns of missing
values are positively correlated with the outcome. For example, any under-sampling may
induce a higher association between the missing observations and the failure of firms. In our
framework, we argue that it is better to look at alternative goodness-of-fit measures that
13Figure A2 provides a graphical intuition. It shows the standardized differences for the unit-level pre-
dictions of the augmented and the original model for 50 randomly selected observations. The standardized
differences in the predictions do not deviate significantly, indicating no statistical difference between the
predictions of the two models.
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take into account unbalanced outcomes while keeping the sample intact. See Table 3 where
we report PR, F1-score, and BACC, and we comment that BART-MIA predictions still show
better accuracy.
4 A case for zombie firms
Originally, the notion of zombie firms relates to the phenomenon of zombie lending, when
banks keep credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers. In some cases, zombie lending
can be a deliberate strategy to avoid a bank’s budget restructuring, while only apparently
complying with capital standards set by the financial regulators (Bonfim et al., 2020), e.g.
the case of Japanese banks in the 1990s (Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Caballero et al., 2008).
More recently, Schivardi et al. (2017) study Italian firms during the financial crisis in 2008
finding that credit misallocation after zombie lending increases the failure rate of otherwise
healthy firms while reducing the failure rate of non-viable firms. The reason is that under-
capitalized banks can decide to cut credit to more viable projects to avoid public disclosure
of non-performing loans in their portfolio. Paradoxically, in times of financial crises, highly
distressed firms may appear resilient thanks to continuous access to financial resources.
From a more general perspective, recent OECD studies (Andrews et al., 2017; McGowan
et al., 2018) show that when zombie firms delay their exit or restructuring, they drag down
aggregate productivity by stifling reallocation of resources towards healthier firms, and by
deterring the entry of potentially more innovative and younger firms.
But how do we spot a zombie firm? There is no consensus on the exact meaning of
the zombie attribute beyond its evocative power. So far, scholars just adopted different
working thresholds based on a proxy assessment of one or more available financial indicators
in the absence of more precise guidance from theory. Ideally, one should consider firms’
competitiveness and financial constraints in a dynamic perspective, having in mind the entire
horizon of future events. After taking into account all future threats and opportunities, and
23
how they mirror on the flows of firm-level profits and net financial payments, one could
obtain the theoretical equivalent of zombie firms. In the absence of the latter, an empirical
identification is left to the creativity of scholars and practitioners. Caballero et al. (2008)
define zombies as firms that receive subsidies under the form of bank credit after observing
how interest payments compared to an estimated benchmark of debt structure and market
interest rates. McGowan et al. (2018) assume that zombies are old firms that have persistent
problems meeting their interest payments, although they center a policy discussion on the
macroeconomic impact of low-productivity firms. Bank of Korea (2013) looks explicitly at
when the interest coverage ratio is lower than one over three years. Bank of England (2013)
overlooks financial management and considers firms that have both negative profits and
negative value-added, hence focusing on the core activity of a company.
According to us, the direction of previous works is clear: one wants to deduce from actual
financial accounts the future ‘viability’ of companies. If they do not seem in good shape now,
the firm will likely be in trouble in the next future. Taken from this perspective, the empirical
classification of zombie firms is a perfect case study for the application of machine learning
techniques to firm-level data. It is a call for using in-sample information to predict an event
that is out-of-sample.
Empowered by the previous intuition, we propose an identification of zombies starting
from predictions of failures obtained in Section 3. We propose to classify as zombies those
firms that are located on the right tail of the risk distribution, and for which the chances to
recover from financial distress are minimal, for at least three years.
In notation, let us start considering the deciles along the predictions f(Xi,t−1), where
each qj,t is the threshold for the jth decile of failing probability at time t:
Qj,t =

1 if f(Xi,t−1) ≥ qj,t ∩ Yi,t 6= 1,
0 otherwise.
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where Yi,t 6= 1 indicates that the ith firm did not fail yet at time t.
Table 6: Transitions across deciles of risk
t / t+ 1 9th decile t+ 1 8th decile t+ 1 7th decile t+ 1 6th decile t+ 1 Below 6th decile t+ 1 Total t+ 1
9th decile t 0.64 0.24 0.07 0.02 0.03 1.00
8th decile t 0.22 0.39 0.21 0.06 0.12 1.00
7th decile t 0.08 0.20 0.28 0.23 0.21 1.00
6th decile t 0.04 0.08 0.23 0.30 0.35 1.00
Below 6th decile t 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.88 1.00
Figure 4: Transitions across deciles of risk: a visualization
t t+1
9th decile 9th decile
8th decile 8th decile
7th decile 7th decile
6th decile 6th decile
Below 6th decile Below 6th decile
In Table 6, we report a transition matrix for the firms that did not fail, based on elabora-
tions over the entire period of analyses in 2008-2017. In Figure 4, we also visualize a Sankey
plot using the same information (Kennedy and Sankey, 1898). We observe that firms that
our predictions locate beyond the 9th decile in a representative year t do not have a high
chance to improve in t + 1. See also the constant trends we report in Appendix Figure A3.
In fact, the greatest majority of them (64%) gets stuck in the same highest-risk category,
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24% transit to the 8th decile, and only 12% are able to recover and reach a more reasonable
level of financial distress. Interestingly, the 9th decile is quite difficult to reach from the
bottom of the distribution, as only 8%, 4% and 1% of firms that are below the 8th, 7th and
6th decile, respectively, are observed to transit to a situation of highest distress. Moreover,
about 88% of company stay below the 6th decile in the entire period of analysis.
In general, we can say that, based on the information we observe, a firm in good shape
does not easily shift into financial distress, but when it does it is difficult to get out of it.
Against this evidence, it makes sense for us to set a working threshold at the 9th decile, as
we realistically would encompass most difficult situations of the business life. Still, we want
to allow firms a period of probation to discount some firms’ break-even strategies in the short
run, as for example in the case of newly-born firms and start-ups. For all the above reasons,
we will define zombie firms those firms that persist for at least three years beyond the 9th
decile of the risk distributions:
1(
3∑
t=1
Qj,t = 3) (5)
where the risk distributions are the ones that we estimate based on the algorithm proposed
in Section 3.
4.1 Zombies in Italy
Following the above definition, we report the share of zombies in Italy in Figure 5, and
we compare them with the GDP growth rates observed in our period of analysis. Interest-
ingly, we find that a range between 2.6% and 4.5% of manufacturing firms are teetering on
bankruptcy. The share of zombies is higher immediately after the country went through
a financial crisis in 2011, and it decreases in recent years from 2014 onward. In fact, the
presence of zombies seems to be in a relationship with the economic cycle. The latter is a
stylized fact that is worth further analyses, beyond the scope of this paper. We presume
that, in times of crisis, many firms can be pushed on the verge of bankruptcy.
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Finally, in Table 7 we briefly show what makes Italian zombies different from the other
companies. We find that they have on average a lower productivity, 21.3% and 44.4% if
measured as TFP or labor productivity, respectively. Moreover, they are on average consis-
tently smaller: they sell 120% less and employ 76% less than the otherwise representative
healthy company.
Figure 5: Zombie firms and the economic cycle
Note: The share of zombies measured on the left axis is compared against the nominal GDP growth
rates on the right axis, sourced from the World Bank, in the period 2011-2017. Zombie firms are firms
located on the right tail (9th decile) of the predicted risk distributions for at least three consecutive
years.
Table 7: Productivity and size premia for zombies vs. healthy firms
Indicator (in logs) Coeff. Std. Error N. obs. Adj. R squared
Total Factor Productivity -.213*** (.049) 568,288 .257
Labor Productivity -.444*** (.038) 577,485 .139
Sales -1.198*** (.055) 595,609 .189
Employees -.760*** (.034) 578,532 .112
Note: We report coefficients of binary regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator of firm’s
productivity or size equal to one if the firm is classified as a zombie in at least one year of our sample.
Zombie firms are firms located on the right tail (9th decile) of the predicted risk distributions for at least
three consecutive years. Fixed effects at the region and industry level. Errors are clustered by region
and industry.
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5 Conclusions
In this contribution, we show how statistical learning can derive non-trivial information on
a battery of financial indicators, and we successfully classify firms in risk categories after
training on past failures. Our preferred algorithm is the BART-MIA, which outperforms
other well-known econometric and machine learning techniques, especially in the presence of
missing patterns of financial accounts.
Thanks to the machine learning framework, we can reduce prediction errors also against
otherwise traditional tools for credit scoring, like the Z-scores and the Distance-to-Default.
Therefore, we propose to classify as zombie firms the ones that persist in high-risk status
because they locate on the right tail of our predictions for at least three years, beyond the
9th decile of risk, where we find that the chances to recover to smaller distress are minimal.
Previous references suggest how the identification of zombies may be crucial for financial
institutions to avoid a waste of credit resources in insolvent companies when the latter out-
live the market only thanks to some mechanisms of adverse selection generated by imperfect
financial markets. Yet, we believe that our exercise can be useful from a more general per-
spective, to spot a share of an economy that is in trouble. The issue is all the more critical
since recent studies discuss how zombies could hamper the growth potential of many coun-
tries, as they stifle the reallocation of productive resources in modern economies (Andrews
et al., 2017; Banerjee and Hofmann, 2018; Andrews and Petroulakis, 2019).
In fact, we find that Italian zombies register lower levels of total factor productivity,
while they are to find among smaller firms. Interestingly, we observe a possible relationship
with the economic cycle that would be worth further investigation in the next future. The
share of zombies is higher in the aftermath of twin financial crises in 2008 and 2011, but
then it decreases in the latest years when recovery was underway. Unfortunately, as things
were starting to get slowly better, the recent pandemic crisis has most probably pushed a
big bunch of firms in a danger zone of high financial distress.
We cannot make predictions for a post-pandemic scenario yet. Still, we presume that the
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problem of separating the companies that can stay on their feet alone from the ones that
conceal their insolvency will be all the more pressing in the next future when the policymakers
start to implement financial support programs. The challenge is to avoid a misallocation of
resources and curb a much-needed economic recovery.
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Appendix: Tables and Graphs
Table A1: Panel (A): List of predictors for firms’ failures.
Variables Description
Operating Revenues, Material Costs, Costs of
Employees, Added Value, Taxation, Tax and
Pensions’ Payables, Financial Revenues, Financial
Expenses, Interest Payments, Number of
Employees, Net Income, Cash Flow, EBITDA
(Earnings before interest, Taxation, Depreciation
and Amortization), Total Assets, Fixed Assets,
Intangible Fixed Assets, Current Assets,
Shareholders’ Funds, Retained Earnings,
Long-Term Debt, Loans, Current Liabilities
Original financial accounts expressed in euro.
Corporate Control A binary variable equal to one if a firm belongs to a
corporate group.
Number of Patents The portfolio of patents granted to a firm by patent
offices (Dummy Patents equal to 0 if the firm issued
no patents, and 1 otherwise).
Number of Trademarks The total number of trademarks issued to the firm
by national or international trademark offices
(Dummy Trademarks equal to 0 if the firm issued
no trademarks, and 1 otherwise).
Consolidated Accounts A binary variable equal to one if the firm
consolidates accounts of its subsidiaries
NACE rev. 2 A 4-digit industry affiliation following European
classification NACE rev. 2.
NUTS 2 regions The region in which the company is located.
Productive Capacity it is an indicator of investment in productive
capacity computed as Fixed AssetstFixed Assetst−1+Depreciationt−1 .
Capital Intensity Fixed Assets/Number of employees.
Labour Productivity It is a ratio of added value over the number of
employees.
Interest Benchmarking It is a zombie proxy proposed by Caballero et al.
(2008) and calculated as R∗ = rst−1BSi,t−1 +
( 15
∑5
j=1 rlt−j)BLi,t−1 + rcb5y,t ·Bondsi,t−1, where
BSi,t−1 are short-term bank loans, BLi,t−1 are
long-term bank loans, rst−1 are the average
short-term prime rate in year t, rlt−j is the average
long-term prime rate in year t, Bonds are the total
outstanding bonds, rcb5y,t is the minimum observed
rate on any convertible corporate bond issued over
the previous five years.
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Table A1: Panel (B): List of predictors for firms’ failures.
Variables Description
Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) It is calculated as EBIT/Interest Expenses. When
it is less than one, Bank of Korea (2013) and
McGowan et al. (2018) assume a firm is a zombie.
Financial Misallocation It is a binary indicator adopted by Schivardi et al.
(2017) for catching zombie lending, based on both
ROA
1
3
∑3
t=1 EBITDAt
Total Assets < prime and
Leverage = Financial DebtTotal Assets > L˜, where prime is the
measure of the cost of capital for firms with a
Z-score equal to 1 or 2, and where L˜ is the median
value of leverage in the current year for firms that
exited in two following years.
TFP It is the Total Factor Productivity of a firm
computed as in Ackerberg et al. (2015).
Financial Constraints It is a proxy of financial constraints as in Nickell
and Nicolitsas (1999), calculated as a ratio between
interest payments and cash flow
Enterprise Value (listed companies only) It is a synthetic value calculated considering other
10 comparable listed companies in terms of Market
Capitalization, Minority Interest, Preferred shares,
Long Term debt, Loans, Other short term debt,
Cash.
Negative Added Value It is a binary variable adopted by Bank of Korea
(2013) for zombie firms, equal to one when Added
Value is negative, i.e. when the value of sold output
is less than purchases of intermediate inputs.
Size-Age It is a synthetic indicator proposed by Hadlock and
Pierce (2010), equal to −0.737 ∗ log(totalassets) +
0.043 ∗ log(totalassets))2 − 0.040 ∗ age.
Profitability Calculated as EBITDA/Total Assets, and adopted
by Schivardi et al. (2017) as a control for zombie
lending
Financial Sustainability It is a ratio calculated as Financial Expenses over
Operating Revenues.
Capital Adequacy Ratio It is a ratio of Shareholders’ Funds over Short and
Long Term Debts.
Liquidity Ratio (Current/Assets - Stocks)/Current/Liabilities
Solvency Ratio (Shareholders funds / (Non current liabilities +
Current liabilities)) * 100
Liquidity Returns It is the ratio of cash flow over total asset
Tax and Pension Payables It is the ratio of the sum of tax and pension
payables over total assets.
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Table A2: Missing predictors and firms’ failures - Chi-square tests
Firm’s failure
0 1 Test Statistic
N = 287587 N = 17319
Interest Benchmarking : 0 38% (110524) 61% (10530) χ21=3414.25, P<0.001
Interest Benchmarking : 1 62% (177063) 39% (6789)
Interest Coverage Ratio : 0 37% (105907) 49% (8422) χ21=970.93, P<0.001
Interest Coverage Ratio : 1 63% (181680) 51% (8897)
Negative Value Added : 0 34% ( 98014) 63% (10915) χ21=5958.81, P<0.001
Negative Value Added : 1 66% (189573) 37% (6404)
Financial Constraint : 0 37% (105904) 49% (8419) χ21=968.27, P<0.001
Financial Constraint : 1 63% (181683) 51% (8900)
Financial Misallocation : 0 39% (112560) 54% (9276) χ21=1415.82, P<0.001
Financial Misallocation : 1 61% (175027) 46% (8043)
Total Factor Productivity : 0 36% (104345) 38% (6600) χ21=23.52, P<0.001
Total Factor Productivity : 1 64% (183242) 62% (10719)
Solvency Ratio : 0 41% (118851) 63% (10897) χ21=3115.5, P<0.001
Solvency Ratio : 1 59% (168736) 37% (6422)
Liquidity Ratio : 0 42% (119357) 72% (12543) χ21=6362.72, P<0.001
Liquidity Ratio : 1 58% (168230) 28% (4776)
Size-Age : 0 42% (120260) 75% (12989) χ21=7310.19, P<0.001
Size-Age : 1 58% (167327) 25% (4330)
Liquidity Returns : 0 39% (112561) 54% (9277) χ21=1416.88, P<0.001
Liquidity Returns : 1 61% (175026) 46% (8042)
Labour Productivity : 0 34% ( 97253) 36% (6221) χ21=32.23, P<0.001
Labour Productivity : 1 66% (190334) 64% (11098)
Profitability : 0 37% (105907) 49% (8422) χ21=970.93, P<0.001
Profitability : 1 63% (181680) 51% (8897)
Financial Sustainability : 0 41% (117294) 64% (11119) χ21=3673.94, P<0.001
Financial Sustainability : 1 59% (170293) 36% (6200)
Capital Intensity : 0 36% (104122) 42% (7325) χ21=261.17, P<0.001
Capital Intensity : 1 64% (183465) 58% (9994)
Note: Chi-square tests for the null hypothesis that missing predictors do not correlate with the event of
failure. Number of observations in parentheses.
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Figure A1: Patterns of missing values from a random subsample of 10,000 observations
Panel (A): Missing values of original financial accounts
Panel (B): Missing values of indicators based on original financial accounts.
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Figure A2: Standardized Differences in the Predictions of Augmented and Original BART
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Figure A3: Transitions after predictions of a zombie status
Note: The bars of the graph indicate the transition of zombie firms in the years following predictions:
i) to failure (bright red); ii) to a relatively lower distress (dark grey); iii) to a permanence in a zombie
status. Negligible and non-visible is the share of firms that transit to an area of no distress (bright grey),
below the median prediction. Please note that we cannot report year 2017, as we cannot compare with
actual observations in following years.
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